Happy Monday!
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov is more than a person; he’s the face of a networked system of governance. If we want to understand the challenge of replacing him, we need to look behind the personalities to the relationships and structures that comprise the regime — as I explained in last week’s newsletter. To do that, we have to map the architecture of the system and its stakeholders.
With that in mind, here’s what you can expect:
- The three pillars of the Chechen regime
- The stakeholders in the system
- Why any successor will need powerful friends
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The three pillars of the Chechen regime
A key feature of the Chechen regime has been the installation of relatives, allies, and allies’ relatives into positions of power. Dozens of people bearing just a handful of surnames now occupy roles that give them access to the resources underpinning a system of patronage. Ramzan Kadyrov and his children stand at the centre of this system.
Subnational authoritarianism of this type has three core pillars: government and state institutions, the security forces, and business. These pillars are territorially grounded, allowing for physical control and access to things like historical memory. Because it is a subnational system, the pillars also sit beneath what is commonly referred to as a krysha, or roof — a more powerful network that provides resources and support. No one has any doubt about which network this is: Ramzan’s relationship with Putin has always been core to his claim to power.
This is what this system looks like:
All three of the pillars are vital to the system as a whole. To govern effectively, the Chechen regime needs to — and does — exercise control over all three.
The stakeholders in the system
This conceptualisation of the Chechen regime allows us to identify key stakeholders — not just by their personalities, but by their structural positions.
First, there are the security service officials: Individuals who occupy command positions within the Defence Ministry, Rosgvardia, and the Interior Ministry. Their positions provide them with access to levers of repression, but also typically facilitates contacts beyond the republic.
Second, there are the businessmen. All major businesses in Chechnya are under the control of the regime, and individuals affiliated with it have accumulated considerable asset outside the republic too. They have access to one of the most valuable resources to flow through patronage networks: money.
Finally, there are state officials. **Ultimately, if you want to govern the state, at some point you have to control its institutions. The leaders of state institutions enjoy access to the state’s resources, but they can also shape the legal and policy framework within which other actors operate.
Why any successor will need powerful friends
It’s important to recognise that neither the positions themselves nor the mere fact of holding them are what truly matters. A position might be a reflection of power rather than its source. State positions are listed last for a reason: although they tend to attract a great deal of attention, a formal role isn’t necessarily the thing that gives a person power. In the sistema understanding of governance, a deputy can sometimes be more important than a principal.
At the same time, formal positions are not irrelevant. They shape perceptions of power and access to resources, both of which are vital components of the system. Power is a subjective phenomenon and one actor needs to believe that another can serve or protect their interests. The weaker the institutions, the more important these subjectivities become.
Nevertheless, what matters most is that this is a networked system of governance, and its component parts can’t be understood in isolation. Far more important than individual positions is the ways in which the different positions and their occupants intersect. Any successor is going to need to either take over this system by coopting the existing networks or dismantle the network and build a new one.
It is precisely this that makes the succession process so complex — far more than just replacing the man at the top. In next week’s newsletter, we’ll explore an illustration of this complexity, using Kadyrov ally Adam Delimkhanov to show how one of the most powerful figures within the regime has connections across all three domains — and in week four, we’ll turn to what it takes to collect and organise this type of data across an entire regime.
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