Happy Monday!

It’s one thing to talk about the benefits of mapping the architectures of governance; it’s quite another to actually do it. In the third part of this mini-series, I’m going to examine just one of the Chechen regime’s stakeholders – State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov – and use him to showcase its structure. This, in turn, will help demonstrate just why any effort to replace the Kadyrov system will need to do more than simply remove Ramzan.

With that in mind, here’s what you can expect:

• Who is Adam Delimkhanov?
• The broad reach of Delimkhanov’s networks
• The challenge that Delimkhanov will pose to any successor

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Who is Adam Delimkhanov?

Adam Delimkhanov has been a key member of the Chechen elite for two decades, having risen through the ranks of the security services before becoming State Duma deputy for Chechnya in 2007. He is one of the closest allies of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov; indeed, back in 2009, Ramzan named him as his nominated successor. Although Ramzan’s children have since achieved adulthood and probably moved ahead of him in the line to the throne, Delimkhanov arguably remains one of the three most important people in the Kadyrov system, alongside Prime Minister Magomed Daudov and Deputy Prime Minister Abuzayd Vismuradov.

Delimkhanov is no stranger to controversy. He has been implicated in the deaths of two prominent Kadyrov rivals – Movladi Baysarov, the former Gorets commander killed “resisting arrest” in Moscow in 2006, and Sulim Yamadayev, whose murder Dubai police accused him of orchestrating – and is suspected of torturing detainees. He was sanctioned by the United States in 2014 over alleged ties to the Brothers’ Circle, a transnational criminal organisation.

More recently, Delimkhanov has actively supported Russia’s “special military operation” and was among the first members of the Chechen regime to deploy to Ukraine. His activities earned him the Hero of the Russian Federation award – along with fresh Western sanctions. None of this hindered his Duma activity too much, if only because he is far from parliament’s most active member: He frequently misses votes and does not appear to have ever addressed a legislative session.

The broad reach of Delimkhanov’s networks

In last week’s newsletter, I sketched out the architecture of the Chechen regime, arguing that it rested on three pillars: the security services, business and money, and state institutions. If we examine Delimkhanov’s networks (Delimkhanov is marked in blue and Ramzan in red), then we can see his influence extends across all three and encompasses both the local and the federal level:

The question of Delimkhanov’s business interests is a complex one: Officially, he has only ever been employed by the state and his official income declarations have been relatively modest. That did not stop Finans magazine identifying him as Russia’s 313th richest person, with wealth of $300 million, in 2011. The key connection here is Razita (Makka) Delimkhanova (marked in orange). She is the registered owner of valuable Moscow property, as is Delimkhanov’s mother, Maryam. Razita and Adam divorced in 2014, but there’s good reason to think this was a mechanism to conceal the family’s wealth. The Kadyrov regime control all major business in Chechnya, so Delimkhanov also likely holds undisclosed assets there.

Ties to state governance structures are the most obvious, given Delimkhanov’s role. One of the most important ties is that to Federation Council Senator Suleyman Geremeyev (marked in green), his matrilineal cousin. The Geremeyev clan is hugely influential in its own right and a number of its members occupy local government roles. Another relative, Musa Demilkhanov, sits in the Chechen parliament.

It’s also worth considering the ties to the Kadyrov family itself, which have been strengthened by marriage and are deliberately tangled. Delimkhanov’s granddaughter (which one has never been publicly confirmed) is now married to Ramzan’s son, Eli, while Medni Kadyrova – whom media have variously identified as Adam’s granddaughter or Suleyman’s daughter – is married to Adam Kadyrov. I’ve written about the role of marriage in the court of Kadyrov in an earlier newsletter.

The challenge that Delimkhanov will pose to any successor

Adam Delimkhanov’s networks help illustrate the way in which relationships within the Kadyrov regime cross domains and create overlapping obligations. They also show why removing any one node – including Ramzan - will not necessarily lead to the collapse of the network itself.

Delimkhanov’s relationships show him to be a powerful actor within the Kadyrov system. He has influence, through his brothers, in the security apparatus that underpins the regime. He has financial resources, hidden behind the likes of his wife and mother. He also has ties to local and federal governance structures, most significantly through his cousin.

Yet, equally important, these relationships are complex and hard to parse. If Adam Delimkhanov were to move against the Kadyrov family, he would need to break the family tie that passes through his granddaughter; indeed, the point of the tie is arguably to bind the two families even closer together. If a successor to Kadyrov wanted to move against Adam, he’d likely have to eliminate the Geremeyevs at the same time. And so on. Political interests and family ties are inseparable in the Kadyrov regime, which makes any effort to realign them immensely challenging. The smoothest transition pathway to a post-Kadyrov Chechnya lies in leaving these interests – and the networks through which they are managed – untouched.

This discussion has focused on only one stakeholder within the regime. Next week, in the final part of the mini-series, I’ll turn to the question it raises: What does it take to map an entire regime in this way? It’s a question I’ve spent years developing the answer to, and I’ll be sharing how you can benefit from it.

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