It is accepted wisdom that the security services are an important part of the regime of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. But how are they used and controlled in practice? What is their role in the regime’s efforts to project force and influence? And what does this tell us about the wider Chechen state apparatus?
It is one thing to offer generalised answers to these questions – to propose theories and ideas as abstractions. It is quite another to develop a robust evidence base to substantiate claims. Yet Chechen involvement in the first few months of Russia’s war on Ukraine provides us with a unique opportunity to do precisely that. In this week’s newsletter, I’m going to introduce a project tracking this involvement and outlining what I hope it will reveal.
Here’s what you can expect this week:
- Understanding the architecture of the Chechen security services
- The Kadyrovtsy at war – and what they can tell us
- Introducing a data-driven project on early Chechen involvement
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Understanding the architecture of the Chechen security services
Before we can begin to understand the role of the Chechen security services, we need to decide what we are talking about. The most common term used to refer to them is the Kadryovtsy. But who does this term actually refer to?
Superficially, this is not a difficult question. In the early 2000s, the term applied to the personal security services of late Chechen leader Akhmat Kadyrov, which at the time were commanded by his son – none other than current leader Ramzan Kadyrov. As Ramzan took over the leadership and consolidated his control, the meaning of the term expanded to encompass all the units that are viewed as primarily loyal to him – and not to the federal institutions they are notionally subordinate to.
But which units actually match this description? Determining this is where problems arise. There are many military units based in Chechnya, and not all of them are under Ramzan’s control. They are not all exclusively manned by Chechens. They are subordinate to different federal institutions: the Defence Ministry, the National Guard (Rosgvardia), and the Interior Ministry. So neither geography, ethnicity, nor institutional affiliation provide us with a tidy answer.
A better approach is to look at the personal relationships of the commanders. People with personal ties to the Kadyrov family or its inner circle can be considered loyalists, as can those with family members that are also employed by the Kadyrov regime. The greater the number and complexity of ties with the current regime that a person has, the more inextricably linked with it their personal futures and interests are likely to be.
Of course, personal loyalty to the regime doesn’t automatically translate into unit loyalty. So we still need to consider the composition and history of the units. But, as noted by a recent report by Memorial (which raised but failed to resolve many of these issues), unit leadership does two things: It allows commanders to replace officers and thus more deeply embed loyalty; and it makes it harder for federal forces to use the units against the Kadyrovs. In other words, appointing a loyalist commander makes unit loyalty far more likely and disloyalty more difficult.
How many units and people match the description above? The aforementioned Memorial report specifies 25 specific units and combines the statements of state officials and media estimates to arrive at an approximate figure of 33,000 people (excluding Spetsnaz Akhmat, which accounts for a further 1,500). Their confidence in this figure is low, not least because it covers the on-paper strength of the units and does not account for vacancies and exaggeration. Yet it is clear that we are talking about a significant number of people. (You can find an interactive map of the architecture of the Chechen security services in the Russian Security Research Lab (RSRL)).
The Kadyrovtsy at war – and what they can tell us
Many of these units and personnel have rotated through Ukraine as part of Russia’s war. Moreover, the war itself has provided an opportunity for the Chechen regime to expand its influence. It has created multiple new units, including within the Defence Ministry – where it previously lacked an institutional presence – and secured the installation of loyalists as commanders of existing ones. Memorial points out that its previous estimate, in 2022, of the size of the Kadyrovtsy placed it at 16-18,000. Even if the actual numbers are uncertain, we can state with confidence that they have increased significantly in recent years.
Numbers, however, only tell us so much. They do not tell us how they are used and controlled in practice. They do not tell us how the regime uses them to project force and influence. They do not tell us about where the security forces fit within Chechen statebuilding as a whole. They do not, in short, help us answer the questions outlined earlier.
What can help us move towards an answer is Chechen security service activity in the early days of the war. This was a period when relationships and structures were in flux and the underlying processes were exposed to view. Even a cursory examination of which people and units deployed first highlights something telling: Formal mandates and affiliations played virtually no role in determining who went to Ukraine. Instead, it was the people who were most trusted by the Kadyrov regime who led the way. Only later did processes become institutionalised and take the form that has more or less persisted to this day.
Examining this early period in particular can therefore tell us a great deal about how the security services are used and controlled. It can also shed light on Chechen statebuilding more broadly – and the ways in which personal networks transcend institutions to provide the backbone of the regime.
Introducing a data-driven project on early Chechen involvement
With that in mind, this week I’m launching a major project to track the evolution of Chechen involvement in Russia’s war on Ukraine, starting with this critical early period. I’m going to look in-depth at the specific actors and the events that they were involved in – including the alleged crimes they perpetrated.
On a basic level, I want to identify who did what where and show how this involvement evolved over time. One of my goals is to produce a detailed dataset providing granular tracking of Chechen security service activity, initially covering the first three months of the war, and then expanding to encompass the entirety of 2022. I’ll publish this dataset in the RSRL, so that you can use it in your own analysis. This data will then provide the foundation for a deeper assessment of the relationship between the security services and the regime.
If there are things that you think this analysis should cover, or questions you want it to answer, then let me know. Otherwise, expect to hear a lot more about Chechen activity in Ukraine in 2022 over the coming weeks and months!
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