For the past three weeks, I’ve been making the argument that understanding the Chechen regime means understanding the system, not the personalities. That, in turn, requires us to map the relationships that underpin it – something I demonstrated last week for just one stakeholder, Adam Delimkhanov. This raises an obvious question: What would it take to map the entire regime this way? Today I want to answer that — and to share something I’ve been building for a long time.
Here’s what I’ll cover today:
- The challenges of mapping a regime
- Introducing the Russian Security Research Lab
- An invitation: fifty founding seats
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The challenges of mapping a regime
Delimkhanov is one node in a wider network. The Chechen regime has hundreds. To tackle a question like “how do you replace Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov?”, you need to place each candidate within their wider context. This, however, is far from simple: information lies scattered across sources; some of it is incorrect; and analysts in a hurry often cite outdated information.
Building a detailed network map is a labour-intensive task and it rarely gets done well. This leads people to fall back on what’s easier: personality-driven analysis drawing on selective and occasionally anecdotal information. This is often a basic resource question: Reinventing the wheel for each analysis is simply too costly.
Introducing the Russian Security Research Lab
The good news is that I’ve spend years doing this foundational work and I’ve been working for months on a way to make the data I’ve collected transparent and accessible. The Russian Security Research Lab (RSRL) is the result of this labour. It’s a structured intelligence resource for analysts working on Russian security.
Inside RSRL, you’ll find verified profiles of key individuals and organisations, relationship maps (like the one you saw last week), incident databases built on transparent sourcing, and backgrounders and curated archives to help make sense of it all. At the moment, these resources are richest for the topics I’ve spent the most time on: North Caucasus security issues, including the Chechen security services and terrorism and political violence. Resources for the federal security services and private military companies (PMCs) will follow.
You can see the architecture for yourself right now at threatologist.com/rsrl. The structure is visible to everyone; it’s the analysis inside that membership unlocks. RSRL is a developing and evolving resource, which is why I’m opening it up in stages.
An invitation: fifty founding seats
RSRL isn’t for sale today. Instead, I’m opening a founding cohort: up to fifty analysts will get free access for six months.
In return, all you need to do is two things. First, provide feedback on what’s useful, what’s missing, and what I should build next. This will only require a modest time commitment and I’ll make it clear how to do this when you’re inside. Second, if you use RSRL in your published work, cite it. The future of RSRL will depend on whether people find it useful – and I want your help in making it so.
Because of this, seats are limited and by application. I’m looking for practising analysts who work on issues related to North Caucasus security and will actually use the lab. I’ll also be inviting some people directly. So if this is the right tool for you, don’t wait. Applications are open now and close on 31 July.
RSRL is a resource I wish I’d had throughout my career – and it’s one I want to help others in their work. If what I’ve covered over the last three weeks has spoken to you, come and help me develop it!
P.S. Regular editions of Tracing Patterns resume in August. I’ll send just two more notes about the founding cohort before applications close — then it’s back to the usual.