How to map a regime


For the past three weeks, I’ve been making the argument that understanding the Chechen regime means understanding the system, not the personalities. That, in turn, requires us to map the relationships that underpin it – something I demonstrated last week for just one stakeholder, Adam Delimkhanov. This raises an obvious question: What would it take to map the entire regime this way? Today I want to answer that — and to share something I’ve been building for a long time.

Here’s what I’ll cover today:

  • The challenges of mapping a regime
  • Introducing the Russian Security Research Lab
  • An invitation: fifty founding seats

To read this newsletter in your browser, click here.

The challenges of mapping a regime

Delimkhanov is one node in a wider network. The Chechen regime has hundreds. To tackle a question like “how do you replace Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov?”, you need to place each candidate within their wider context. This, however, is far from simple: information lies scattered across sources; some of it is incorrect; and analysts in a hurry often cite outdated information.

Building a detailed network map is a labour-intensive task and it rarely gets done well. This leads people to fall back on what’s easier: personality-driven analysis drawing on selective and occasionally anecdotal information. This is often a basic resource question: Reinventing the wheel for each analysis is simply too costly.

Introducing the Russian Security Research Lab

The good news is that I’ve spend years doing this foundational work and I’ve been working for months on a way to make the data I’ve collected transparent and accessible. The Russian Security Research Lab (RSRL) is the result of this labour. It’s a structured intelligence resource for analysts working on Russian security.

Inside RSRL, you’ll find verified profiles of key individuals and organisations, relationship maps (like the one you saw last week), incident databases built on transparent sourcing, and backgrounders and curated archives to help make sense of it all. At the moment, these resources are richest for the topics I’ve spent the most time on: North Caucasus security issues, including the Chechen security services and terrorism and political violence. Resources for the federal security services and private military companies (PMCs) will follow.

You can see the architecture for yourself right now at threatologist.com/rsrl. The structure is visible to everyone; it’s the analysis inside that membership unlocks. RSRL is a developing and evolving resource, which is why I’m opening it up in stages.

An invitation: fifty founding seats

RSRL isn’t for sale today. Instead, I’m opening a founding cohort: up to fifty analysts will get free access for six months.

In return, all you need to do is two things. First, provide feedback on what’s useful, what’s missing, and what I should build next. This will only require a modest time commitment and I’ll make it clear how to do this when you’re inside. Second, if you use RSRL in your published work, cite it. The future of RSRL will depend on whether people find it useful – and I want your help in making it so.

Because of this, seats are limited and by application. I’m looking for practising analysts who work on issues related to North Caucasus security and will actually use the lab. I’ll also be inviting some people directly. So if this is the right tool for you, don’t wait. Applications are open now and close on 31 July.

RSRL is a resource I wish I’d had throughout my career – and it’s one I want to help others in their work. If what I’ve covered over the last three weeks has spoken to you, come and help me develop it!


P.S. Regular editions of Tracing Patterns resume in August. I’ll send just two more notes about the founding cohort before applications close — then it’s back to the usual.

About me

I'm Dr Mark Youngman, an open-source investigator specialising in Russian security. I run Threatologist, which provides bespoke analysis and data to analysts, policymakers, and legal teams who need evidence that stands up to scrutiny. To find out more about what I offer, check out Threatologist.com.

600 1st Ave, Ste 330 PMB 92768, Seattle, WA 98104-2246
Unsubscribe · Preferences

Tracing Patterns

Each issue unpacks a major news story from the world of Russian security — tracing the relationships, trends, and deeper meaning behind it — so you can move beyond surface-level news and better understand the threats coming from Russia today.

Read more from Tracing Patterns
Tracing Patterns logo

Happy Monday! It’s one thing to talk about the benefits of mapping the architectures of governance; it’s quite another to actually do it. In the third part of this mini-series, I’m going to examine just one of the Chechen regime’s stakeholders – State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov – and use him to showcase its structure. This, in turn, will help demonstrate just why any effort to replace the Kadyrov system will need to do more than simply remove Ramzan. With that in mind, here’s what you can...

Tracing Patterns logo

Happy Monday! Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov is more than a person; he’s the face of a networked system of governance. If we want to understand the challenge of replacing him, we need to look behind the personalities to the relationships and structures that comprise the regime — as I explained in last week’s newsletter. To do that, we have to map the architecture of the system and its stakeholders. With that in mind, here’s what you can expect: The three pillars of the Chechen regime The...

Tracing Patterns logo

Happy Monday! In this newsletter, I’ve talked a fair bit about the Kadyrov regime and the succession question. This week, I want to kick off a four-part series that reframes how we look at the topic — starting with why the debate over who replaces Ramzan Kadyrov begins with the wrong question. With that in mind, here’s what I’ll cover this week: Kadyrov is a system, not a person Missing the forest for the trees Don’t study the player, study the game To read this newsletter in your browser,...