In a result that surprised absolutely no one, Ramzan Kadyrov secured a comprehensive victory in this week's elections, ensuring that he will remain as Chechen head for the foreseeable future. The size of his “victory” was preposterous, but what many observers miss is that the preposterousness is the point. In this week’s newsletter, I’ll explain why the Chechen regime does not even pretend that it’s elections are competitive.
Here’s what you’ll find this week:
- Ramzan’s inevitable victory
- Breaking all the records
- Why preposterousness is the point
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Ramzan’s inevitable victory
There were just three candidates for the role of Chechen head in the elections, held on 20 September 2026: incumbent Ramzan Kadyrov, Public Chamber Chairman Ismail Denilkhanov (Just Russia) and Chechen Parliamentary Deputy Khalid Nakayev (Communist Party of the Russian Federation).
The Kadyrov regime exercises complete control over formal politics in the republic, so Ramzan’s “victory” was never in doubt, but the choice of two regime insiders as opponents made it clear that competition would be even be simulated. Denilkhanov and Nakayev both had the good sense not to campaign too vigorously — if, indeed, their activities could be characterised as campaigning at all. They understood their role as well as anyone else.
The Central Election Commission duly reported a landslide win for Kadyrov: He secured 99.85%, compared to 0.05% for Denilkhanov and Nakayev. Turnout was 85.24% (OC Media, 2026).
Breaking all the records
Since the result itself was no surprise, much of the media coverage highlighted the record-breaking nature of the reported figures.
Ramzan has a long-history of landslide electoral victories: His previous record was 99.73%, achieved in 2021. Nakayev’s support — which is presumably found exclusively in his own family — has apparently collapsed in the intervening years, given he achieved 0.15% back then (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2021). If beating your opponent isn’t all that difficult, at the very least you can beat yourself.
Some journalists compared this to global victories: Rwanda’s Paul Kagame (99.18% in 2022), Kenya’s Uhuru kenyatta (98.26% in 2017), Tanzania’s Samia Suluhu Hassan (98.1% in 2025) and Saddam Hussein (99.9% in 2002) (OC Media, 2026). Why preposterousness is the pointSimilar comparisons were drawn in 2021 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2021).
Why preposterousness is the point
Commenting on the results, Chechen human rights and political activist Ruslan Kutayev claimed he could not see the logic of such inflated results: “Whether it’s a demonstration of force or something else, it’s hard to say” (Caucasian Knot, 2026). This is not an uncommon reaction, where the sky-high figures tend to prompt ridicule. No one takes these elections seriously.
Yet the election results should be viewed as a signalling mechanism. In authoritarian settings, they serve this purpose anyway, demonstrating the ruling authorities’ ability to mobilise support and control the political system. But excess sends an even stronger signal: It tells its audience that yes, we know this is ridiculous, you know this is ridiculous, but there’s nothing you can do about it. It can be seen as part and parcel of the same logic that leads the regime to give itself endless awards (see my newsletter from January 2026 for more on this) or flaunt violations of the law.
This taunts the audience to do something about the absurdity, confident that it can’t — and knowing that this failure to act serves as public confirmation of its own power. Others are forced to contort themselves to justify the impossible. Back in 2008, Kadyrov claimed turnout for parliamentary elections could be “100%, or even more” (Caucasian Knot, 2008). It fell to a member of the Central Election Commission to explain how this could be possible (RIA Novosti, 2008). Even President Vladimir Putin was compelled to acknowledge in 2021 that the results “could appear unrealistic”, but he justified them through reference to Kadyrov’s apparent achievements in rebuilding the republic (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2021).
The harassment of Chechen residents and anyone considered “unreliable” that was reported in the run-up to the polls (OC Media, 2026; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2026) fits the same pattern. The Chechen authorities were not genuinely concerned about disruptions to the polls or their own ability to achieve the desired results. Instead, the harassment sent the same signal: We are in charge and we can do as we please.
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