This week, I want to touch on a topic that’s been rattling around my head for quite some time: the question of which parts of the Chechen security apparatus matter most. After all, the overall number of units is large and continually growing, but not all play an equally important role. Understanding which ones are significant helps focus attention — both for monitoring and accountability purposes.
With that in mind, here’s what you can expect this week:
- How to determine which units matter
- The key components of the Chechen security apparatus
- Following the muscle men
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How to determine which units matter
In Russia, as most of you know, formal mandates and institutional affiliations only tell us so much — and sometimes they can be downright misleading. A subordinate can be more powerful than their boss; an organisation may perform a role that is outside their formal mandate.
Various theoretical models have been developed to account for this phenomenon in wider Russian politics. Most scholars recognise that analysing the state in a Weberian sense — as something comprised of routinised, formal institutions — paints, at best, an incomplete picture. Instead, some of the most widely used approaches, such as Hale’s patronal politics or Ledeneva’s sistema, call attention to the importance of personal relationships and patterns of interaction. Formal institutions can matter, but often they serve as recognition of power, not its source.
The Chechen security services certainly fit within this framework. Many units exceed their formal mandates; some are far more important to the regime than their institutional position might suggest. Two things, more than anything, give us insights into their role: The personal relationships of the leaders and the way in which they are deployed by the authorities. Perhaps the clearest illustrations of this came in the early days of Russia’s war on Ukraine, when a hotchpotch of military leaders were deployed — primarily because they were the ones most trusted by Chechnya’s leader.
The key components of the Chechen security apparatus
Which units, therefore, matter most in the extensive landscape of the Chechen security services? I would argue that six units are particularly important — and there are threads running between them. All of them have participated in Russia’s war on Ukraine:
- SOBR Akhmat (formerly SOBR Terek). This is an elite rapid reaction unit subordinate to Rosgvardia. It engages in tactical and combat operations, including counterterrorism. It was sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2019 and the UK Government in 2020 for human rights violations. It is closely associated with Abuzayd Vismuradov, a staunch ally of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov who headed the unit between 2012 and 2020 and is now deputy prime minister for security affairs. It is currently led by Timur Edilov.
- The 249th Detached Special Motorised Battalion (Yug). Another Rosgvardia unit, it is subordinate to the 46th Detached Operational Brigade and was one of the first units to deploy to Ukraine. Then, it was commanded by Khuseyn Mezhidov; now, its leader is Saydi Lorsankayev.
- The Akhmat Kadyrov Special Purpose Police Regiment. Most militarised units moved from the Interior Ministry to Rosgvardia when the latter was created in 2016. A key one to remain was the special purpose regiment, which is one of many to carry the name of Ramzan’s father. It claimed a central role in defeating the domestic insurgency — including the operation that killed Aslan Byutukayev, the last recognised insurgent leader (first with the Caucasus Emirate, then the Islamic State’s Caucasus Wilayah), in 2021. It is led by Zamid Chalayev, one of four brothers to occupy command positions in the security services and the original commander of Spetsnaz Akhmat (which, incidentally, is not included here because it does not play a role in domestic security).
- OMON Akhmat-Groznyy. This is a riot police unit subordinate to Rosgvardia, originally created in 2000. It is led by Anzor Bisayev, who, like Mezhidov, was one of the very first senior members of the Chechen security service to deploy to Ukraine.
- The Akhmat-Kadyrov 141st Special Motorised Regiment (Sever). Yet another unit within Rosgvardia, it is subordinate to the 46th Detached Operational Brigade. It deployed early to Ukraine under the command of Magomed Tushayev — where it worked alongside Bisayev’s OMON-Groznyy and may have been involved in the Bucha massacre in 2022. Its current commander is Ibragim Ismailov.
- The Kurchaloyevskiy Rayon Police Department. If ever there were proof that organisational structures only tell you so much, it is the Kurchaloy district police. In theory, they should only be responsible for local policing duties. The clue to their importance comes from what is located within Kurchaloyevskiy Rayon: Tsentoroy (Akhmat-Yurt), the familial stronghold of the Kadyrov regime. The department has played a key role in suppressing domestic dissent, including the 2009 murder of human rights activist Natalya Estemirova. It is led by Rustam Aguyev, who succeeded his brother, Ismail, in 2017. Ismail now heads the Ministry of Defence’s Zapad-Akhmat unit.
Following the muscle men
Any significant development involving the Chechen security services is likely to involve these units — and the men who cycle through them. They are not the only units that matter, but constitute the trusted core of the force structures underpinning the regime.
Developments of note could occur in different ways. On the one hand, it is worth paying particular attention to where the units and affiliated individuals go and what they do — essentially narrowing the scope for monitoring and potentially responses to something more manageable.
For example, SOBR Akhmat has functioned as something of a training ground (including in a literal sense) for Kadyrov’s most loyal troops. Magomed Tushayev started there, then went to the Sever Regiment, and is now in charge of the 96th Operational Regiment — further extending his influence in Rosgvardia. In March 2025, the Ministry of Defence established the 270th Motor Rifle Regiment Akhmat-Kavkaz and appointed the aforementioned Khuseyn Mezhidov to command it. Both units thus become candidates for those warranting particular attention going forward.
On the other hand, should the Kadyrov regime ever wobble, any defections and dissent from these quarters would be particularly significant. This, to be clear, doesn’t currently look likely, but the situation could change once the transition process is properly underway (i.e. Kadyrov leaves the stage).
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