Happy Friday!
I hope your week has been filled with joy. It’s muggy where I am, which probably means — since my part of the world ain’t exactly renowned for its climate — it’s hot where you are too. Dr Mark prescribes lots of ice cream. Frankly, no matter what the weather!
I’m someone who likes a big project. Or seven. I’m also someone who feels a little lost without one. Publishing my book therefore left a bit of a vacuum: I need something big to work towards, something that inspires and motivates me in equal measure.
Thankfully, after much pondering, I’ve finally settled on one. Or, rather, two! So this week, I wantto give you an insight into both projects — and what they might lead to in the future.
With that in mind, here’s what you can expect this week:
- Building a resource hub for the ages
- Developing a theory of subnational authoritarianism
- Where both projects will lead
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Building a resource hub for the ages
I think most researchers face two interlinked problems. On the one hand, we swim in an ocean of information, much of which is not easy to use or keep track of. On the other hand, it can be a struggle to find good quality information, because the signal-to-noise ratio is terrible. The result: If we want to produce good, evidence-based work, we have to waste a lot of time sifting through the proverbial haystack, looking for needles (which is apparently in the ocean. Have you noticed I love mixed metaphors?!).
For some time, I’ve had a vision to develop a solution to this problem, at least for people working on Russian security issues. I also have vast amounts of high-quality information that I’ve accumulated over the years and that I know I could make better use of. What I plan to create is a structured resource hub that will help you quickly understand actors, events, and their context — so you can answer questions and progress your research quicker.
Long-time readers may recall I’ve spoken about this before. The hub even has a name: The Russian Security Research Lab. In the background, I’ve slowly been working to bring this vision to life, collecting and verifying data on people, organisations, incidents, etc — and creating resources that show how they are connected.
One of the challenges is that the task is potentially infinite. The world of Russian security is, after all, not exactly small. And there is a natural tension between depth and breadth: too little of the former and the resource will be of limited use; too little of the latter and it’ll be exceptionally useful — but only to people working on very niche topics!
So I’ve decided to develop the lab in phases. The first will focus on North Caucasian security, in particular the regime in Chechnya. The second will expand to look at Russia’s security services more broadly. Phase three will then encompass private military companies and other semi-state security services. Phase four is world domination (that always needs to be on the cards).
My second project helps explain why I’ve decided to focus on the North Caucasus and Chechnya…
Developing a theory of subnational authoritarianism
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov is dying. He’s been dying for quite some time now — and not just in a ‘we all die in the end’ kind of way. He’s like that relative that no one likes and everyone is ready to bury, but who insists on clinging to life a little longer just to piss everyone off some more before they go.
Kadyrov’s long demise has meant I’ve had far too long to ponder the nature of the Chechen regime and the succession challenge that his death poses. Over time, my ideas have coalesced into something resembling the start of a theory about subnational authoritarianism.
At the core of this theory is the idea that the Kadyrov regime (like that of Putin) is much more than a man — the Kadyrov regime is a system. Replacing the key figure in the system will not automatically lead to its collapse. This marks a key difference between Kadyrov and, say, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, whose empire was always susceptible to ‘no Prigozhin, no problem’.
But that gives rise to a key challenge: How do we go about analysing it as a system? What are its key characteristics? What makes it resilient? What’s the difference between it and other, less entrenched phenomena — like Prigozhin’s empire? And how does this feed into the succession question?
I’ll flesh out the details of my nascent theory in a future newsletter, but I think the key is to understand the networks that comprise the regime and how they intersect across three domains: state, security, and business. So, my second big project is to develop my ideas into a full-blown theory of subnational authoritarianism that leverages Social Network Analysis (SNA).
Where both projects will lead
The good news — for me at least! — is that these two projects will work in harmony with each other. Indeed, the second will give the first focus and help ensure that the lab has genuinely useful content.
An SNA approach to the Kadyrov regime, for example, requires a lot of data. And I mean a lot: Thus far, I’ve mapped out 539 relationships of varying depths, and that’s really only the start. But this means that, when you want to know anything about the regime (Kadyrov or post-Kadyrov), the lab will be a really unique resource at your disposal.
Examining different aspects of the Kadyrov regime will also bring other issues into clearer focus. Zooming in on the security services will create a clearer picture of their role in Russia’s war on Ukraine. Unpicking the regime’s corporate empire will shed light on its lesser-studied features — and the ways that corporate raiding play out today.
Eventually, the goal will be a book on subnational authoritarianism in Chechnya, but there will be a rich harvest of material produced en route.
So expect to see much more on these strands in the future — and know that there is something linking these diverse topics behind the scenes!
In the meantime, if there are things you want me to cover through these projects, hit reply and let me know!
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