Happy Monday!
I hope the world is treating you well. Here, it is quiet. Working for myself means regularly alternating between feast and famine, and this is most definitely a season of famine. I’m hoping January will be significantly busier, but if you’ve got a project that you think I can help you with, now is a great time to get on my schedule!
When it comes to the ideas I explore here, I often fall into one of the traps that is the curse of academia: the pursuit of originality. I look for something new, preferably with new data to go with it. Never mind that there is nothing new under the sun and what you think of as original is usually little more than a marker of the books you haven’t read. The endless quest for the original blinds us to the value of turning over the same ideas, considering them from different angles, and reflecting on what has changed since the last time.
With that in mind, I hope you will forgive me — in what is probably the last newsletter of the year — for returning to a familiar topic: the question of who will succeed Ramzan Kadyrov as Chechen leader and the significance of the different options. It’s prompted by an interview I gave last week and a realisation that many of my current ideas are scattered across different pieces.
Here’s what you can expect this week:
- Known unknowns
- The different choices and their implications
- Markers for the future
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Known unknowns
The most important questions surrounding the future fate of the Kadyrov regime are those we don’t have good answers to.
First, there is the all-important question of when Ramzan will die. Rumours of his ill-health appear to be well-founded: his illness has been visible, his public appearances increasingly infrequent, and the positioning of his son as heir apparent all too obvious. In talking about Ramzan’s demise, therefore, we are not engaging in the same kind of ‘does he look frail?’ or ‘everyone dies eventually’ speculation that surrounds President Putin. Ramzan will die, and sooner rather than later. Yet these health issues have persisted for a couple of years and still he hangs in there. Whether he dies next week or next year could have a huge impact on the wider political dynamics that will feed into decision-making.
Second, we don’t really know who will be influencing the decision over the succession or the weight they will have in discussions. Yes, we can make educated guesses: the Presidential Administration (PA) and federal security services will jockey to influence the decision (with identifiable institutions and personalities involved); Kadyrov undoubtedly has his own preferences (discussed below); the existing Chechen elite will at a minimum need to acquiesce (at least if instability is to be avoided); and Putin will be the final arbiter (Chechnya has always been closely linked to his image). Nevertheless, within that, we cannot definitively say which voices will carry greater weight. Will the security services exercise greater influence than the PA? If the former, which will be more decisive, the FSB or Rosgvardia? If the latter, who within the PA?
Illustrative of the way in which speculation masquerades as analysis, a recent Vazhnyye istorii article claimed that Sergey Kiriyenko, first deputy head of the PA, was trying to secure the appointment of Spetsnaz Akhmat commander Apti Alaudinov. Yet its sole source for that particular claim was a rather speculative article from Novaya Gazeta Europe, published in April 2024, when Alaudinov’s profile was at its peak. Novaya Gazeta made no reference to who in the PA was making decisions, while Vazhnyye istorii somehow contrived not to mention Kiriyenko’s boss, Anton Vayno — with whom the Kadyrovs have endeavoured to build strong relations.
Third, we don’t know what the priorities and risk tolerance of the decision-makers are. This is quite logical, given the previous point. Do they want to maintain the status quo, because this serves both local and federal elite interests? Or do they want to seize the opportunity to wrestle back some of the control and autonomy that the Chechen regime has gained? If they pursue the latter option, are they willing to risk conflict with the existing Chechen elite to achieve it? I explored these questions in more depth in an earlier newsletter but, again, we can make educated guesses but offer few answers with a high degree of certainty.
The different choices and their implications
Given these known unknowns, it is possible to present a plausible case for multiple candidates. It is therefore more fruitful to reflect on what each of these choices would mean for Chechnya’s future.
The heir apparent: There is little reason to doubt that Adam Kadyrov is Ramzan’s choice to succeed him. State-controlled media have worked tirelessly to elevate his profile, and he has been appointed to several notionally important roles — with a particular focus on the security services. He has surpassed his brother, Akhmat, and, in a highly gendered society, his better-prepared sister, Ayshat, is not an option. Adam is not a political actor in his own right: Everything he has he owes to his father, and he has no independent networks or political experience. That doesn’t mean, however, that he should be taken lightly: his position is comparable to that of Kim Jong Un when he took over in North Korea. Age is the biggest obstacle to his ascension: Having only just turned 18, he is a long way short of the 30 legally required to become head of a republic. If he were chosen, it would therefore signal the Kremlin’s willingness to change or ignore the rules to maintain the status quo. It could also mean a drawn-out transition process accompanied by repression as Adam tries to build his own network.
The loyalist: Magomed Daudov has been a loyal servant to the Kadyrovs for many years, most recently as parliamentary speaker and now prime minister. If the Kadyrovs want someone to keep the seat warm for Adam without having to worry about excessive ambition, Daudov is the ideal candidate. He is likely to be acceptable to the Kremlin for the same reason: someone who is sufficiently ruthless and competent but unlikely to get ahead of their station. Yet he is unlikely to be a true powerholder: For all his years at the centre of the current regime — and unlike many other members of the elite — he has failed to build his own networks in government, business and the security services. Only his son, Chechen First Deputy Sports Minister Umar Daudov, is a recognisable ally.
The muscle man: Deputy Prime Minister Abuzayd Vismuradov is another important figure within the regime and would also signal continuity of the current system. He has a couple of advantages over Daudov: he is more highly integrated with the Kadyrovs — his son, Ramzan, is married to Kadyrov’s daughter, Tabarik — and he has strong connections with the security services. The biggest question mark around him is whether he can build ties at the federal level, and thus assuage concerns there that he will protect their interests too. To date, Vismuradov’s most extensive ties outside Chechnya have been within the MMA scene.
The egoist: Apti Alaudinov is in many ways the mirror image of Vismuradov. He has a similar background in the security services, having previously been Chechen deputy interior minister and now commanding ‘volunteers’ in Ukraine. The war has been good for Alaudinov, boosting his national profile and allowing him to expand his contacts outside Chechnya. It is entirely plausible that some people at the federal level would see him as a more ‘civilised’ figure. He is evidently ambitious too, though that should give those self-same federal figures pause for thought if controllability is a key factor. What he lacks, however, are robust networks within Chechnya. Prior to the war, he became persona non grata for his involvement in an attempted coup against Kadyrov. His ascension, therefore, is likely to require the dismantling of the current system and would lead to clashes with those who would be disenfranchised.
The deputy with a dark past: The Kadyrov regime is not just the Kadyrov family; it is a network of intersecting clans. The three most important ones are the Kadyrovs, the Delimkhanovs, and the Geremeyevs. The most prominent representative of the Delimkhanovs is State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov. He has been a long-standing ally of Ramzan and, prior to the emergence of the children, spoken of as his heir. Through his current role, he also has strong ties at the federal level, which complement extensive business interests and family members in important security service roles. Some dismiss him as too embroiled in controversy — links to criminal networks, a tendency to make public threats, involvement in criminal cases, etc — to be a candidate. To my mind, this underestimates the deep cynicism of the Russian political system and its media machine. If it can shamelessly convince you black is white, it can certainly whitewash Delimkhanov’s reputation.
The senator in the shadows: The most prominent representative of the Geremeyev family is Federation Council Senator Suleyman Geremeyev. His family is connected to the Kadyrovs through marriage and the Delimkhanovs through blood. Structurally, he is almost identical to Adam Delimkhanov and, like him, would represent the closest thing to preserving the status quo. Yet he has one advantage over Adam: although he was involved in the early years in many of the same scandals, in recent years he has rarely been discussed by the media. His reputation, therefore, is easier to clean and he probably has fewer sworn enemies.
The wildcard: The final candidate, by definition, has no name. It would be a complete outsider, similar to Sergey Melikov when he was appointed to head Dagestan. Such an appointment would signal a desire to turn Chechnya into just another Russian region. But this would clearly run counter to the interests of the current elite, with all the risks that entails. An outsider might also struggle to control processes and may trigger a descent into instability. As an option, it can’t be ruled out, but it seems less likely.
Markers for the future
I will not dwell too long on what this all means — this newsletter is long enough already! If I had to put money on an option, I would probably spread my bets across Daudov as a placeholder or Delimkhanov/Geremeyev as longer-term independent actors. Either way, my intuition is that risk aversion will trump any desire for change and a rebalancing of power in favour of the federal centre or specific institutions. That would speak in favour of the continuity candidates.
It may be that there are very few public markers that will help resolve the known unknowns. The succession process has been underway for a couple of years and still these questions have persisted. The best we might be able to achieve is to quickly interpret the change once it occurs.
And that, more than anything, suggests we should critically assess the evidence base of any claims that are made. There will be plenty of confident assertions made between now and Kadyrov’s funeral, including by the relentless experts-in-everything who sound so assured every time they jump on the media circuit. If the only foundation for a claim is ‘an anonymous Kremlin insider,’ ‘a veteran of the KGB with expertise on the North Caucasus,’ or whatever has been posted to Telegram this week, then we should recognise it for what it is: pure speculation.
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